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One must speak of a struggle for a new culture, that is for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality and, therefore, a world intimately ingrained in ‘possible artists’ and ‘possible works of art’.​[1]​ 

In his Prison Notebooks of the 1930s, the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, famously envisaged communist revolution as a ‘struggle for a new culture’. The contest for what he called ‘hegemony’ entailed a politics directed not only at the coercive apparatuses of the state but, more importantly, across the cultural and ideological bastions of civil society where he believed ways ‘of feeling and seeing reality’ nourished consensual behaviour among the populace. Gramsci’s reflections on hegemony have since secured him the status as one of the key thinkers of so-called ‘western Marxism’ with an acute eye for processes of ideological struggle in the developed capitalist states. But, despite the many efforts to generalise these thoughts, there is a sense in which Gramsci’s theoretical innovations developed out of a quite particular cultural milieu, where the relation between politics and aesthetics, everyday life and art, violence and freedom were being dramatically recast. 

Even in prison, where he was removed from direct political activity, Gramsci’s fundamental points of reference were the crisis opened up in the aftermath of the First World War, and the opportunity for revolutionary advance this crisis had promised and to which the Italian left had, he felt, had failed to respond with anything like the necessary degree of preparation. Those opportunities persistently troubled Gramsci in his Notebooks and they formed an often unacknowledged backdrop to the distinctive theory of revolution he developed there.​[2]​ Like other radical intellectuals of the post-war period – the so-called dopoguerra –  Gramsci sympathised with much of the spirit of aesthetic revolt and the desire for cultural modernisation that Marinetti and the futurists had promoted since 1909. If he did not share all their beliefs or political aspirations, nevertheless we can detect a similar desire in Gramsci’s early post-war writings to cultivate new principles ‘of feeling and seeing reality’ from within the everyday life of industrial production. Like the futurists, before his arrest and imprisonment, Gramsci had looked to industrial modernity to offer up dynamic figurations of public space that would replace the old liberal politics and creatively rework the opposition between the principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘order’.





It is common to see futurism as a vital precursor to fascism. In its celebration of war and violence, the wholesale rejection of the past, the dynamism of industrial life, and the aspiration for national, spiritual renewal merging art and life, futurism undoubtedly anticipated the bombastic style of politics that came to be embodied in fascism. Walter Benjamin, for one, was in no doubt that Marinetti’s exaltation of war expressed the inner logic of fascism’s ‘aestheticization of political life’.​[3]​ In biographical terms, too, Marinetti and his followers, similarly to Mussolini, were active in revolutionary syndicalist politics and, later, supported intervention in the First World War, gleefully enlisting to serve (and, in some cases, eventually to die) on the battlefield. In 1919 Marinetti himself openly aligned futurism with the fascist ‘movement’.

If these explicit overlaps and alignments offer well-founded evidence of futurism’s inclinations, nevertheless recent research suggests that the politics of futurism were much more complex than simply anticipating or following aspects of fascism.​[4]​ There was no unified political outlook among futurist artists, who embraced anarchism and socialism as well as nationalism. If some, like Marinetti, came to support fascism with relative ease, others remained less inclined to do so, aligned themselves firmly to the left or, like Marinetti himself after some years, withdrew their support from Mussolini’s more ‘compromised’ version of fascism after the movement tilted towards conservative elites in the 1920s.

But if the explicit political ties and aspirations of futurism were not exclusively and openly fascist, might it be said that its aesthetic orientation lent itself primarily to a fascist form of politics?​[5]​ Here we also need to be careful about imputing a single aesthetic principle to futurism. Marinetti’s own statements have perhaps encouraged us to think of futurism as a hyper-modernist, iconoclastic and fundamentally belligerent style: all dynamism, violence and destruction at the expense of a more constructive outlook. But, as is often the case with fascism, we have a habit of reading backwards from our knowledge of the present to those movements and experiences that anticipated it, ascribing to them a certain intentionality or inevitability about what came later. 

Unfortunately, this can obscure the way aesthetics works its own politics and feeds into a variety of projects. As Jacques Rancière argues, aesthetics can be understood as ‘a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience’.​[6]​ As a mode of organising what Rancière calls the ‘distribution of the sensible’ aesthetics contributes to politics by defining communal experience in distinctive ways and not simply in the intentions and attachments of its authors. He continues: ‘The arts only ever lend to projects of domination or emancipation what they are able to lend to them, that is to say, quite simply, what they have in common with them: bodily positions and movements, functions of speech, the parcelling out of the visible and the invisible’.​[7]​ Rancière’s understanding of aesthetics implies an indeterminacy about the relation of artistic practices and political movements, and indicates a gap between the sensibilities worked out in artistic practices and the variety of projects that seek to capture some or all of these sensibilities.

If futurism’s aesthetics is equated entirely with fascist politics, we neglect not only the fact that other modernist movements competed to associate themselves with fascism (revealed also in debates at the time about ‘fascist art’),​[8]​ but, more importantly, the way the arts rarely determine a singular politics so much as lend themselves to an articulation of experience from which political agents later draw. At a certain conjuncture, we might therefore say, futurism and fascism came to overlap, drawing upon common motivations, principles and ideals. But it would be wrong to think that even fascism was a singular movement with a coherent structure. In its early years, particularly, neither Mussolini nor his followers were wholly certain about what fascism stood for and where it was going. What drove it along was not any clear goal or stable constituency of support but the crisis and collapse of the liberal state after the war. To a large extent spurred on by the explosive style of the futurists, fascism mobilised a mass movement based on the concrete experience of the trenches. But in the period between 1919 and 1922, as the crisis of the liberal state deepened, fascism was not the only political movement seeking to replace the liberal order. Nor was it the only one to borrow from futurism.





Futurism brought together a variety motifs: a hostility to the past and a denunciation of tradition; the celebration of the modern industrial city and the objects and processes in it such as cars, planes, machines, and so on; and an excited glorification of the violence these new objects could bring to the past by announcing a new order of values. Whilst the art work of futurism has been criticised for being superficial and of uneven quality, there is in the movement as a whole a view that a new horizon of sensibility –Rancière’s ‘distribution of the sensible’ – was in formation, one that could give life to an alternative social order or, at very least, destroy the old one. If its proponents suffered an inflated view of their own prophetic vision, nevertheless they were engaging because they sought to dispense with the stuffy, ordered world of nineteenth-century bourgeois civility and embrace a logic of ceaseless creativity. This, it seems, was a central thread in the many futurist manifestos from 1909 onwards.​[10]​ While, undoubtedly, these tended to overstate the moment of breach with the old order, at stake were the issues – vital to anyone seeking to bring Italy into accordance with modernity – concerning the where and what of art: where did we find it, what was an object of art? Moreover, how were we to experience it? The answer, typical of the modernist avant-garde, was that it was in the daily life of the city; art was in sounds, sights and spaces of everyday urban living. We experience it as participants and not as passive observers. From the outset, futurism announced a total transformation of sensuous experience, a wholesale spiritual revolution enacted on the stage of industrial modernity. If it was superficial and uneven, it was partly because it could never seriously accomplish the enormous task it set itself.

It was the futurists’ vision of a world bursting with a noisy, violent sensuousness that brought them into alignment with the various, other anti-bourgeois sentiments and movements in Italy. The post-unification state was a fragile, fragmented, and uneven balance of power; not the noble, liberal self-image of autonomous individuals pursuing their private interests in a market economy against the backdrop of a respect for public institutions, to which many liberals had aspired. The idealised view of a stable balance of private and public life was hard to maintain in a largely agricultural economy with industry supported by protectionism, and with a restricted franchise and politics dominated by a narrow social elite. This was a state frequently disrupted by violent dissent and sustained by the authoritarian imposition of order. Futurism’s belligerent modernism reflected and magnified the violence of this incomplete state and made the very impossibility of a moderate, liberal separation of public and private worlds into the very sensibility of modern life.

One key motif in the futurist toolkit that explored this disruption of orderly public space was the notion of ‘intersecting planes’ discussed repeatedly in the manifestos written by the painter and sculptor, Umberto Boccioni, and exemplified in his work in particular. For Boccioni, the clashing and overlapping lines of movement captured the vital truth of futurist art.

In the ‘Technical Manifesto of Futurist Sculpture’ of 1912, Boccioni claimed that:

in the intersecting planes of a book and a corner of a table, in the straight lines of a match, in a blind drawn across the a window, there is more truth than in all the knotted muscles, all the breasts and buttocks of heroes and Venuses, which are still the main inspiration of our demented modern sculptors.​[11]​

These intersecting planes were claimed to represent figures not as oblique, isolated forms fixed in space and time, juxtaposed to each other, but as a dynamic movements of colour and light whose ultimate reality lay not in their independence from their context but their expansion into it [see photo: Boccioni’s ‘Dynamism of a Cyclist’, 1913].

Thus Boccioni called his sculptural work a ‘sculpture of the environment’ in which there existed a ‘systematization of the vibrations of lights and the interpretations of planes’. The ‘sculptural block itself ‘, he claimed, ‘will contain the architectural elements of the sculptural environment in which the object exists’.​[12]​ This technique produced what he referred to as a ‘spatial liberation’ in which the figure merges into the lines of light, architecture and movement that surround it, generating a vision of objects that can ‘never be finite’.

Boccioni referred to this intersection or interpenetration of planes as a way of ‘making objects live by showing their extensions in space as sensitive, systematic and plastic; no one still believes that an object finishes off where another begins or that there is anything around us – a bottle, a car, a house, a hotel, a street – which cannot be cut up and sectionalized by an arabesque of straight curves’.​[13]​

The theme of intersecting planes was not simply his own technique in painting and sculpture, argued Boccioni. It had already occurred elsewhere in painting and in poetry and was characterised by a freeing up of the space of figurative representation to articulate a dynamic, moving process. For him, that meant completely abolishing the finite line:

Let’s turn everything upside down and proclaim the ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE ABOLITION OF FINITE LINES AND THE CONTAINED STATUE. LET’S SPLIT OPEN OUR FIGURES AND PLACE THE ENVIRONMENT INSIDE THEM. We declare that the environment must form part of the plastic whole, a world of its own, with its own laws: so that the pavement can jump onto your table, or our head can cross a street, while your lamp twines a web of plaster rays from one house to the next.​[14]​

Here it is not the individual parts but the ‘plastic rhythm of the whole’ that is conveyed; by following the lines of objects to infinity, the objects themselves undergo a decomposition, breaking down as their lines form new shapes with those of other objects.​[15]​ Boccioni called these ‘force-lines’ which envelop spectators and force them to struggle with the picture.

Putting the spectator at centre meant putting one into the wider dynamic that engulfs the field of vision: the spectator is caught inside the experience of movement and the sensation of figures disappearing into a larger whole. Planes and surfaces, claimed Boccioni, had an ‘emotive power’ in as much as they were the medium of a complex, interpenetrating multiplicity that formed into new and creative experiences, not discreet and isolated moments and figures.​[16]​ 

This experience was called ‘simultaneity’ – the synthesis of a variety of distinct experiences in one whole, a fragmented unity ‘of what one remembers and of what one sees’​[17]​ – and it exemplified for the futurists the aesthetic of modern life itself, the ‘dynamic sensation’ that articulated a kind of violence within the works themselves.

Intersecting planes, then, conveys a dominant motif of futurist art and articulates its various themes of industrial modernity, violent rhythms and a movement of modern life that decomposes the figures of bourgeois life and weaves them back into a wider synthesis of lines and planes.

The dynamic decomposition of isolated figures into spontaneous, creative forces that expand into their environment, refiguring them and pulling them into new forms, expressed a peculiar combination of liberation and force, of destruction and reconstruction that would become politically resonant some ten years later in wake of violent rupture to liberal regime following the war. By then, of course, circumstances had changed. Some of the leading futurists, such as Boccioni himself, had died in battle. Moreover, the context of artistic and political agitation had transformed radically. As Walter Adamson has argued: ‘The war set avant-garde modernism, along with virtually everything else, in a fundamentally new context. One of its effects was to undermine the credibility of the model of avant-garde activity in which some charismatic individual, through provocation and bombast, rallies a band of like-minded performers’.​[18]​ Now it was time for political movements – and mass movements in particular – to replace the elite dominated politics of the pre-war years. Political organisation, mass action, ideological alignment: these were the forms of politics in the dopoguerra to which aesthetes and intellectuals had to adapt themselves.​[19]​ And it was inside the collapsing ruins of the liberal state that figures such as Gramsci, too, sought to imagine new formations of freedom and order.

GRAMSCI: THE FACTORY STATE

Gramsci, of course, was no futurist. But he was quite familiar with its personnel and their manifestos. He was certainly conscious of its artistic novelty. In the years before the war he defended the futurists from attack by a horrified mainstream press, describing them as ‘linked to the new tendency in the most modern contemporary art’. He even acknowledged Marinetti’s poetry as ‘the perfect counterpart’ in ‘linguistic expression’ to ‘the pictorial forms of Ardegno Soffici or Pablo Picasso’: ‘The image does not appear to the imagination diluted into adverbs or adjectives, gently unwinding into conjunctions and prepositions, but as a successive or parallel or intersecting series of noun-planes with clearly defined limits’.​[20]​

As a revolutionary socialist journalist and theatre critic, Gramsci held rather distinctive, sometimes ambiguous views about modernist art work. In his early years he was closely attached to workers’ education associations. He promoted the development of a socialist culture based on largely humanist principles of self-discipline by means of which workers would come to ‘know themselves’ as historical subjects by cultivating an ascetic refusal to indulge their lower instincts and, instead, expand their knowledge of high culture. But in this (often pious) exhortation of the values of self-education, Gramsci aligned with aspects of the avant-garde intellectuals of the time. Like them, he saw the prospects of a wholesale cultural renewal, inspired (as they were, too) by the French syndicalist Georges Sorel and his notion of a ‘catastrophic break’ with the bourgeois order, a violent separation of one society from the other. But if the futurists took Italy’s war with Libya in 1911 as a model of the kind of event that might wake up provincial Italian society, for Gramsci it was the Russian revolution of 1917 that stood as the exemplar of a total, fundamentally spiritual breach.​[21]​

If the avant-garde had spoken, to a great extend, to like-minded intellectuals and artists, Gramsci spoke to the burgeoning industrial proletariat in his university town, Turin. Like the futurists and their sympathisers, the young Gramsci promoted his cultural socialism as a whole new way of life, a new order of sensuality and experience. If the avant-garde looked to the union of art and life through the medium of the artist, Gramsci looked to the union of socialism and life. Thus as late as 1921 he was still arguing for a new ‘proletarian civilization’. That meant ‘to destroy spiritual hierarchies, prejudices, idols and ossified traditions’. It meant, he went on, ‘not to be afraid of innovations, audacities’.​[22]​ It was the futurists, he pointed out, who had ‘carried out this task in the field of bourgeois culture. They have destroyed, destroyed, destroyed’. And in this destruction Gramsci admired them as revolutionaries who, in that respect at least, were well ahead of the proletariat.

They have grasped sharply and clearly that our age, the age of big industry, of the large proletarian city and of intense and tumultuous life, was in need of new forms of art, philosophy, behaviour and language.​[23]​

Gramsci’s cultural outlook had long pitted him against the traditional forms of worker association that dominated Italian socialism. He sought a new, egalitarian society in which workers were not simply recipients of the kindnesses of moral improvers and left-inclined professors, but agents of their own emancipation. Although in his theatre criticism he was often dully traditional and dismissive of modernist productions, it was typically in defence of the potential for the workers themselves to develop their own institutions and culture.​[24]​ Like the futurists, Gramsci also looked for a de-provincialization of Italian culture; but one forged by workers themselves with a ‘modern’ socialist morality.

It was in the post-war years, however, when Gramsci’s cultural socialism properly came into its own. The end of the First World War resulted in tremendous social division in Italy and a widespread ideological disaggregation as the state struggled to maintain order. Post-war governments failed to find a cohesive majority as anti-liberal parties jostled to replace the state altogether. It was in this context of social tension, anti-governmental disaffection and ideological experimentation that Gramsci led a novel effort to develop a concrete socialist alternative to the liberal state. The biennio rosso (or ‘two red years’) of 1919-1920 saw widespread strikes and conflicts between industrialists and the industrial workforce in the north of Italy. In Turin, ‘the industrial city par excellence’, as Gramsci called it, the metal workers’ disputes, in April and then again in September 1920, provided the backdrop for an intervention by Gramsci that recalled the theme of intersecting planes and repartitioning public space pronounced by Boccioni ten years earlier. In his review, Ordine Nuovo (‘New Order’), Gramsci argued the case for a democratic workers’ state based in the industrial factories and formed around the existing grievance committees known as ‘factory councils’. 

‘The working class is closing ranks around its machines; it is creating its own representative institutions based on labour’, he declared confidently in 1920.​[25]​ For Gramsci in this period, industrial production stood as the model of a new organisation to replace the liberal state and the capitalist economy. And it is in his writings around this theme that Gramsci came closest to referencing the motifs the futurists had deployed as integral to a new cultural sensibility before the war. Gramsci’s early cultural socialism, with its emphasis on humanist principles, was replaced with a fascination with the new figuration of the worker inside the work place. Let us trace these references in his writings on the factory state.

Gramsci’s journal published a variety of articles from numerous authors – theorists as well as workers – envisaging a new kind of state organisation.​[26]​ If he wasn’t the author of all the ideas, nevertheless his work was an original synthesis of the ideas in circulation.​[27]​ The factory state was to reconfigure capitalist society by making material production the locus of political power: the system of factory councils were devised ‘to replace the private and public institutions of the democratic-parliamentary state’.​[28]​ Gramsci imagined ‘a network of proletarian institutions … rich with dynamism and potential’ that would free production from the ‘suffocating and parasitical tyranny of private ownership’ and hand the management of industry to the workers themselves.​[29]​ Gramsci’s general design was for a series of factory-based councils consisting of elected members from various plants. These councils would then link up with others across the country to form national and, ultimately, international offices of producers, co-ordinating production through ‘horizontal and vertical planning’.​[30]​ Having eliminated private ownership the state was no longer to be a separate institution serving the needs of propertied classes but what Gramsci called a ‘gigantic mechanism of production which – for all its various connections and inter-relations and the new and higher functions that are necessitated by its huge size’ is still ‘ordered into harmonious hierarchy’.​[31]​

The premise for this new state formation was the increased autonomy of the worker in the industrial factory. With mechanisation and technical specialisation on the shop floor, it was no longer necessary for an industrialist or manager to oversee and control production. Workers had become liberated from their reliance on hierarchies inside the workplace: they themselves could manage the production process and see it through from start to end without the authority of a manager or owner. In Gramsci’s view, the worker had ceased to be a mere ‘instrument of labour’: no longer an external element added to the process, he had transformed into a ‘producer’, an integral part of productive activity itself. Thus the forms of interest mediation and authority associated with earlier stages of industry were no longer appropriate to the age of  large-scale, mechanised production methods. The trade union, for example, ‘divides up workers according to the tools they use in their work’: ‘The worker then becomes fixed in this particular capacity and attitude, and sees his work not as a moment in the process of production, but simply as a means to earn his living’.​[32]​ The worker, as employee in a factory, ‘merely executes given tasks’: ‘he is not a point that moves to create a line: he is a pin stuck in a particular place and the line is made up of the sequence of pins that have been set up by an alien will for its own ends’.​[33]​ This artificial division, however, now had the potential to be overcome:

The worker can come to conceive of himself as a producer only if he conceives of himself as an inseparable part of the whole system of labour that he finds in final expression in the finished product, only if he lives the unity of the industrial process: a process involving collaboration between manual workers, skilled workers, administrators, engineers, technical managers.​[34]​

Increasingly, argued Gramsci, the workers had developed a sense of their own autonomy from higher levels of management and begun to locate themselves as moments in the wider process of production. They were developing a sense of themselves – a new psychology – as producers, ‘a joyous awareness of being an organic whole’, adopting a ‘communist consciousness’.​[35]​ Here he gives full vent to his idealized vision of the producer:

The more the proletarian specializes in a particular professional task, the more conscious he becomes of how indispensable his companions are; the more he feels himself as one cell within a coherent body, possessed of an inner unity and cohesion; the more he feels for order, method, precision; the more he feels the need for the whole world to become like a vast factory; organized with the same precision, method and order which he recognizes as vital in the factory where he works; the more he feels the need for the order, precision and method which are the life-blood of the factory to be projected out into the system or relations that links one factory to another, one city to another, one nation to another.​[36]​

Gramsci conceived the producers as moments in the formation of an ‘organic’ system consisting of interweaving functions and processes that transcend them but also concretely rely on them.​[37]​ Here the state was no longer something external to individuals but was ‘immanent’ to their everyday activity as producers. It was not a contractual arrangement arising from the clash of private needs of external individuals but the outcome of a dynamic movement operative inside the factories and expanding outwards to the rest of society. What was catered for in the factory state was not exclusively individuals with rights but a functional unity of a greater process. This is why Gramsci persistently underscored the unity of ‘freedom’ and ‘discipline’ in the new state: workers were liberated from their separateness as workers; their freedom to govern production came to be expressed in a consensual self-discipline that expressed their dissolution as individuals and their adherence to the ‘rhythms’ of the industrial process.

It would be wrong to claim that Gramsci was consciously adopting futurist language or seeking to convince his audience of an explicitly aesthetic sensibility: his goals were much more overtly political and engaged with practical rather than purely imaginative possibilities. There are also differing accents within his writings, some emphasising the moment of liberation and autonomy, others the moment of order and discipline, with neither being satisfactorily reconciled to the other.​[38]​ 

But throughout his theorisation of the factory council state during 1919 and 1920, there are undoubtedly resemblances with the motifs of futurism and the image of intersecting planes: the location of the industrial city as the stage of a modern sensibility based around the experience of mechanised industry; a violent break with the old order attended by a spiritual transformation that floods into everyday life; the decomposition of separate bodies into moments of a wider, dynamic movement that transcended the individual and refigures public space, joining together various spatial planes of social and economic organisation. If his was not an attachment to futurist aesthetics per se, nevertheless Gramsci’s efforts to define a new, combined productive and political regime shared in broadly similar principles. That is, in Rancière’s terms, Gramsci’s factory council ideas imagined a ‘distribution of the sensible’ that echoed futurist motifs, recasting them as an emergent political praxis rather than an artistic techniques.

It is perhaps no surprise, then, to find that in this period Gramsci was broadly favourable to efforts by local Turinese futurists – who were more inclined to support the left than they were to follow Marinetti’s flirtation with fascism – to cooperate with the workers’ movement in promoting a  distinctly workers’ art and culture. As Berghaus demonstrates, in 1921 under Gramsci’s protection (as an executive member of the newly formed Communist Party) futurists participated in the Turin section of the Proletkult movement, which had originated in revolutionary Russia and aimed to enhance workers’ own cultural expression rather than have them instructed only in bourgeois art.​[39]​ In a letter to Trotsky of 1922, Gramsci indicated that through Proletkult’s activities even Marinetti was ‘satisfied to have been convinced that the workers understood Futurist art far better than the bourgeoisie’.​[40]​ But Gramsci also noted that after the war the Futurist movement had ‘entirely lost its character and split up into different trends’ and that the workers ‘had to fight for their freedom with weapons in their hands and had little interest in the old arguments’.​[41]​ Fundamentally, for Gramsci, the centre of gravity in preparing a new proletarian civilisation lay in the workers’ struggles in the factories and on the streets, not exclusively in their efforts to produce art.

HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL SPACE

As we can see from the quote that opens this article, Gramsci continued to insist in the Notebooks that the struggle for a new culture was essential to proletarian revolution. By that time, however, the political situation had moved on substantially. So, too, had Gramsci’s conception of political action and the strategic significance of cultural struggle. In order to see how things had changed, let us clarify briefly the difference between the Gramsci of the dopoguerra and the Gramsci of the Notebooks.

The disputes in Turin had culminated in the famous ‘occupation’ of the factories by the metal workers in September 1920. For a while, it may have seemed that Gramsci’s ambition for the workers to manage the industrial process themselves was justified.​[42]​ But even he knew that the occupations were doomed to failure. Lack of support from the wider workers’ movement led eventually to the negotiation of a truce and a return to work. As Gramsci predicted earlier, the failure of the workers’ movement to unify behind a clear alternative to the collapsing liberal state gave the initiative to the forces of reaction.​[43]​ Fascism inherited the revolutionary initiative and far more successfully mobilised public support against the left in the name of a ‘national’ subject and a politics modelled not on the mechanised processes of industrial production but on the violent experiences of the trenches. Gramsci’s own reflections turned very soon to the formation and definition of the communist party, that is, an agency self-consciously outside the production process designed to coordinate revolution externally.​[44]​

In prison, Gramsci developed his theory of the revolutionary party as a ‘Modern Prince’ designed to organise proletarian hegemony by assembling a vast movement of groups and classes around the goal of socialist revolution.​[45]​ Whilst this project may seem in keeping with his earlier reflections on cultivating a socialist culture prior to revolution, there were significant differences.​[46]​ In light of the fragmentation of the left and its defeat by fascism in the mid-1920s, Gramsci transferred over from the workers to the party the role of elaborating and sustaining a ‘national-popular’ collective will. If, rightly, this is regarded as a major revision of Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party (given its ‘mass’ character), nevertheless the coordinates of the new revolutionary politics were quite different from those of his factory council writings.

It is often noted that, in prison, Gramsci no longer dwelled on the ‘spontaneity’ of the workers’ action. In the Notebooks, spontaneity was regarded with suspicion and, whilst valuable as a spark for further action, in need of guidance by the party cadres.​[47]​ The concept of hegemony referred both to the project of developing a new revolutionary movement, but also to the capacity of old ideas and beliefs to linger in the minds of the populace, stifling their revolutionary aspirations and narrowing their intellectual horizons. This was undoubtedly a criticism of the failings of the biennio rosso where there was no agency effectively to sustain and channel the workers’ ambitions in the long term. 

But if Gramsci’s emphasis was on organisation and no longer on spontaneity, the imagery of political space had also transformed. From the outset, the analysis of hegemony entailed acceptance of the ‘liberal’ distinction between state and civil society, if only as a ‘methodological criterion’. The state apparatuses ruled by force, but civil society was the basis of freely-given consent. While the two dimensions combined to ensure the overall domination of the bourgeoisie, Gramsci’s whole emphasis in the Notebooks was precisely on the need to attend to the operation of consent, understood as a subjective condition whose imperatives were often in contradiction with the practical reality of exploitation and disempowerment. This disjuncture between state and civil society, external force and internal consent – rather than their emergent unity – defined the whole project of the Notebooks which accepted such divisions as an empirical given and formulated a strategy designed eventually to overcome them. Rather than reading reality in terms of the blurring and overlapping of lines of division, Gramsci employed a ‘Machiavellian’ conception of political space that appeared fragmented, layered, contradictory and often resistant to innovation. His acceptance of the divisions of space had important consequences for how a revolutionary politics was to be conceived.

For example, the formation of hegemony was conceived as the complex assemblage of a coalition of forces – of workers, peasants, and intellectuals – in what Gramsci revealingly called a ‘historic bloc’. No longer the smooth, ‘harmonious hierarchy’ of subjects inside a spontaneously generated praxis, the new order was to be forged from an uneven social field marked by lingering ‘traces’ of the past. Thus Gramsci’s metaphors are often of a military nature (‘war of position’, ‘war of manoeuvre’) indicating a gradual, tactical construction of ‘relations of force’​[48]​ rather than an emergent subject, conscious of its own unity of purpose. Gramsci imagined hegemonic politics in terms of the formation of ‘a new, homogenous, politico-economic historical bloc, without internal contradictions’ – a process primarily of building and securing. Finally, freedom and discipline no longer combined in an immanent overlapping of roles and functions. Instead, the party had to forge its unity with functional roles delineated and authority resting ultimately at the top, despite the need to cultivate close relations with the wider society. Gramsci undoubtedly offered a more pluralistic and, to some extent, democratic version of the revolutionary party. But there is also no doubting that the language of assemblage, tactical movement, all of an organism leading from above, contrasted radically with the imagery of dynamism, fluidity of positions and common psychology that I have associated with the motif of intersecting planes. 

In the Notebooks, then, the space of political intervention was no longer constituted through the spontaneous intersection of planes of industrio-productive praxis. Instead, it was an externally managed process by which the party intervenes and weaves itself into a variety of socio-cultural relations prior to assaulting the state apparatus. In his writings on cultural issues in prison, Gramsci foregrounded this moment of organisation and assemblage. That, too, was the thrust of our opening quote where Gramsci reflected on the place of the artist and new forms of art. Any new artistic sensibility was tied to a prior expansion of a new distribution of the sensible. As he continued elsewhere:

art is always tied to a definite culture or civilization and [..] by fighting to reform culture one comes to modify the ‘content’ of art and works to create a new art, not from the outside (by professing a didactic, moralistic or prescriptive art) but from deep within, because man is totally altered when his feelings, his conceptions and the relationships of which man is the necessary expression are themselves altered.​[49]​

As is well known, a large part of the Notebooks was dedicated to arguing that the category of ‘intellectuals’ must be regarded as a social phenomenon linked to class formations – as he says, ‘the relations of which man is the necessary expression’ – rather than a wholly independent and autonomous élite. Gramsci’s reflections on art reinforced this point in so far as he insisted that artists and their work must be grasped as components of larger assemblages and not, as he believed was a tendency among Italian intellectuals, as aloof, autonomous innovators. This goes some way to explaining the sharp words he now had for futurism, which he described at one point as ‘the carnival-like and clownish tendency of arid and sceptical petty-bourgeois intellectuals’.​[50]​ 





Gramsci’s responses to the crisis of the Italian state support Rancière’s view that ‘politics is aesthetic in principle’, that is, that any political intervention entails an effort to structure experience that makes that intervention simultaneously ‘poetic’ and argumentative.​[52]​ Indeed, Gramsci’s writings on the factory state and, later, on hegemony involved the refusal to endorse a principled separation of the aesthetic and the political: all political action for Gramsci was rooted in ways ‘of feeling and seeing reality’. 
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